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HAND DELIVERED
Geoffrey Butler
Clerk of the Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: American Salt v. Hatch
Case No. 860048
Our reference: 03245.005
Dear Geoff:
Oral argument was held in the above referenced case on November
12th of this year. Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (1985). I am writing this letter to set forth
supplemental citations which support the arguments American Salt made
at oral argument.
At oral argument, American Salt argued that the 15 cases cited byHatch (interpreting Federal, Colorado and Illinois law concerning
tariffs generally) were inapplicable to this case. The remedy American
Salt seeks is an order of reparations from the Public Service
Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20. The remedy of reparations
under Federal law, Colorado law, Illinois law and Utah law is a remedy
that can be ordered only by the administrative commission with
jurisdiction over the particular case. Since none of the cases cited
by Hatch are appeals from the administrative commission of the
jurisdiction involved, the dissatisfied shippers in those cases could
not procedurally seek the remedy of reparations.

Geoffrey Butler
November 14, 1986
Page 2
The following citations support this argument:
1.
49 U.S.C. 304a (as amended 1965; repealed 1978) -- the Federal
reparations statute under the Interstate Commerce Act. A copy of
the statute as shown in Pub. Law 89-170, § 6, 79 Stat. 651 (Sept.
6, 1965) is attached as Exhibit A.
2.

The following cases interpret § 304a as amended in 1965:
A.
Western Transportation Company v. Wilson and Company,
Inc., 682 F.2d 1287, 1231 (7th Cir. 1982).
B.
Mohasco Industries, Inc. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 491
F.2d 1082, 1084-1085 (5th Cir. 1974).
C.
United States v. Associated Transport, Inc., 505 F.2d
366, 368-369 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

3.
111. Rev. Stat., ch. Ill 2/3, § 9-252 (1983) -- the Illinois
reparation statute (previously codified as 111. Rev. Stat., ch. Ill
2/3, par. 76. (1943)) A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit
B.
4.
Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, 340 N.E.2d 98,
102, 34 111. App. 3d 448 (1st Dist. App. Ct. 1975) -- interpreting
the Illinois reparation statute. A copy of the case is attached as
Exhibit C.
5.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-119 (1963) -- the Colorado reparation
statute. A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit D.
6.
Bonfils v. Public Utilities Commission, 189 P. 775, 780 (Colo.
1920) -- interpreting the predecessor reparation's statute in
Colorado.
I am enclosing the original of this letter and ten copies. I would
appreciate your filing this letter with the Court for its consideration.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely yours.

Charles M. Bennext
CMB:wps
Enclosures
cc:
Merlin O. Baker (w/encl.)
CDN4313B
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enforce obedience thereto by a writ of injunction or by other process,
mandatory or otherwise, restraining such person, his or its officers,
agents, employees, and representatives from further violation of such
section or of such rule, regulation, requirement, or order; and enjoining upon it or them obedience thereto. A copy of any application for
relief filed pursuant to this paragraph shall oe served upon the Commission and a certificate of such service shall appear in such application. The Commission may appear as of right in any such action.
The party who or which prevails in any such action may, in the
discretion of the court, recover reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed
by the court, in addition to any costs allowable under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff instituting such action shall be
required to give security, in such sum as the court deems proper, to
protect the interests of the party or parties against whom any temporary restraining order, temporary injunctive or other process is
issued should it later be proven unwarranted by the facts and
circumstances.
"(3) In any action brought under paragraph (2) of this subsection,
the Commission may notify the district court of the United States in
which such action is pending that it intends to consider the matter in a
proceeding before the Commission. Upon the filing of such a notice
the court shall stay further action pending disposition of the proceeding before the Commission."
SEC. 6. (a) Paragraph (2) of section 204a of the Interstate Comr^^lndl^?-*'
merce Act (49 U.S.C. 304a) is amended to read as follows:
charges.
"(2) For recovery of reparations, action at law shall be begun 63 Stat ' 280,
against common carriers by motor vehicle subject to this part within
two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and
for recovery of overcharges, action at law shall be be^un against common carriers by motor vehicle subject to this part within three years
from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, subject to
paragraph (3) of this section, except that if claim for the overcharge
has been presented in writing to the carrier within the three-year
period of limitation said period shall be extended to include six months
from the time notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant
of disallowance of the claim, or any part or parts thereof, specified
in the notice/'
(b) Section 204a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 304a)
J\^\^1/
is amended by redesignating paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) as paragraphs (6), (*7), and (8), respectively, and by inserting immediately
after paragraph (4) thereof the following:
"(5) The term 'reparations* as used in this section means damages 4,Re ? a " a *~ S - M
resulting from charges for transportation services to the extent that
the Commission, upon complaint made as provided in section 216(e)
of this part, finds them to have been unjust and unreasonable, or *l^fc !ie'
unjustlv discriminatory or unduly preferential or unduly prejudicial."
SEC. Y. (a) Paragraph (2) of section 406a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 L^.S.C. 1006a) is amended to read as follows:
TZ^^^C82'
"(2) For recovery of reparations, action at law shall be begun
against freight forwarders subject to this part within two years from
the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and for recovery
of overcharges, action at law shall be begun against freight forwarders subject to this part within three years from the time the cause
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of action accrues, and not after, subject to paragraph (3) of this section, except that if claim for the overcharge has been presented in
writing to the freight forwarder within the three-year period of limitation said pericd shall be extended to include six months from the
time notice in writing is given In the freight forwarder to the claimant
of disallowance of the claim, or any part or parts thereof, specified
in the notice/*
(b) Section 4(>6a of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. 1006a)
is amended by redesignating paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) as paragraphs (6). (7), and (S), respectively, and by inserting immediately
after paragraph (4) thereof the following:
"Reparations."
"(5) The term 'reparations' as used in this section means damages
resulting from charges for transportation services to the extent that the
Commission, upon complaint made as provided in section 406 of this
49 use i2oo86
part) finds them to have been unjust and unreasonable, or unjustly
discriminatory or unduly preferential or unduly prejudicial/*
9
49 use 9oi -923
^EC. 8# ^ P a r t ^ o f t h e I n t e r s t a t e Commerce Act is amended by
inserting immediately after section 312 the following new section :
"REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATES \ND PERMITS

49 use 905.

49 use 904.
54 Sta* ^34
49 USC 905

"SEC. 312a. (1) Certificates and permits shall be effective from the
date specified therein, and shall remain in effect until suspended or
revoked as provided in this section.
"(2) Any certificate or permit issued under this part may, upon
application of the holder thereof, in the discretion of the Commission,
be amended or revoked, in whole or in part, or mav, upon complaint, or
on the Commission's own initiative, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing, be suspended, changed, or revoked, in whole or in
part, for willful failure to comply with the provisions of section 305(a)
with respect to performing, providing, ana furnishing transportation
upon reasonable request therefor: Provided, however, That no such
certificate or permit shall be suspended, changed, or revoked under
this paragraph (except upon application of the holder) unless the
holder thereof, fails to comply, within a reasonable time, not less than
thirty days, to be fixed by the Commission, with a lawful order of the
Commission, made as provided in section 304 (e) of this title, commanding obedience to the provisions of section 305(a) with respect to performing, providing, and furnishing transportation upon reasonable
request therefor."
(b) The table of contents in section 301 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 901), is amended by inserting immediately
after and below
"Sec. 312. Transfer of <t»rtitUates and permits

the following:
"Set*. HVM\. R<*\<Narioii uf <vrtitic;ite> inul i*rihir* '.

Approved September 6. 1965.

9-252. Excessive or unjust rate or charfe—Refund to customer—Actions to
recover damages—Cumulative remedy
§ $-252 When complaint is made to the Commission concerning any rate or
other charge of any public utility and the Commission finds, after a hearing, that the
public utility has charged an excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount for its
product, commodity or service, the Commission may order that the public utility
make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest at the legal rate from
the date of payment of such excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount
When a customer pays a bill as submitted by a public utility and the billing is later
found to be incorrect due to an error either in charging more than the published rate
or m measuring the quantity or volume of service provided, the utility shall refund
the overcharge with interest from the date of overpayment at the legal rate or at a
rate prescribed by rule of the Commission Refundis and interest for such overcharges may be paid by the utility without the need for a hearing and order of the
Commission
If the public utility does not comply with an order of the Commission for the
payment of money within the time fixed in such order, the complainant, or any
person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in a circuit court of
competent jurisdiction a complaint setting forth briefly the causes for which the
person claims damages and the order of the Commission in the premises Such
action shall proceed in all respects like other civil actions for damages, except that on
the trial of such action the order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated If the plaintiff shall finally prevail, he or she shall be
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of
the action
All complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the Commission
within 2 years from the time the produce, commodity or service as to which
complaint is made was furnished or performed, and a petition for the enforcement of
an order of the Commission for the payment of money shall be filed m the proper
court within one year from the date of the order, except that if an appeal is taken
from the order of the Commission, the time from the taking of the aopeal until its
final adjudication shall be excluded in computing the one year allowed for filing the
complaint to enforce such order
The remedy provided in this section shall be cumulative, and in addition to any
other remedy or remedies in this Act provided in case of failure of a public utility to
obey a rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission
Uws 1921, p 702, § 9-252, added by PA 84-617, § 1, eff Jan 1, 1986
Prior Lawr
Uws 1913.
Uws 1921.
Uws 1925,
Uws 1935,

P
P
P
P

Uws 1943 vol 1, p 1037 § 1
PA 81-1007 § 1
P A 83-345 § 69
PA 83-629 § 1
PA 83-1362, Art II, § 124

497 § 72
702, art V, §72
509, § 1
1093, § 1

ARTICLE X

111 Rev Sut 1983

ch

1U2/J, U 76

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION AND THE COLRTS [NEW]

10-101. Investigations and hearings
§ 10-101 The Commission, or any commissioner or hearing examiner designated
by the Commission, shall have power to hold investigations, inquiries and hearings
concerning any matters covered by the provisions of this Act, or by any other Acts
relating to public utilities subject to such rules and regulations as the Commission
ma> establish In the conduct of any investigation,
inquiry or hearing the provisions
of The Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act,1 including but not limited to Sections
2
10 and 11 of that Act, shall be applicable and the Commission's rules shall be
consistent therewith Complaint cases initiated pursuant to any Section of this Act,
investigative proceedings and ratemaking cases shall be considered "contested
cases" as defined in Section 3 02 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act,3 any
contrary provision therein notwithstanding Any proceeding intended to lead to the
establishment of policies, practices rules or programs applicable to more than one
utility may, in the Commission's discretion, be conducted pursuant to either rulemak

151
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been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, or at least in the one
and one-half months following the trial, if
in fact it was available. It should be noted
that witness Heard was listed on the list of
witnesses furnished to the defendant before trial. Again we observe that if the
information referred to had been obtained,
if admissible it could have impeached the
testimony of Heard. However, the evidence as to the beating of the deceased by
the defendant was from witnesses other
than Heard. Therefore the new evidence
was not of such a conclusive character that
would probably change the result of the
trial. We believe the action of the trial
court in denying the offer of proof was
not an abuse of discretion.

After the sentencing hearing the court
imposed a sentence of 20 to 40 years imprisonment which is within the proscribed
statutory recommendations for the crime
of murder under both the new and old
statute. We have held that the trial court
is given a great deal of discretion in sentencing and its decision should not be reversed or reduced unless there is substantial reason for doing so. (People v. Bell
(1st Dist. 1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 130, 309 N.
E.2d 344.) Considering the nature and circumstances of the crime, we find no substantial reason to reduce the sentence.
The judgment and sentence of the circuit
court of Cook County are affirmed.
Affirmed.
STAMOS
cur.

[12] The final issue raised by the defendant is that the sentence imposed by the
court was excessive. Prior to sentencing
the court considered a presentence report
concerning the defendant which consisted
of a personal history including social conditions surrounding the defendant's life.
A hearing in aggravation and mitigation
was conducted in accordance with the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(Ill.Rev.
Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-4-1.) In
addition the trial court asked defendant's
counsel to explain the differences to the
defendant between being sentenced under
the old and new statute. Prior to January
1, 1973 the statute in Illinois provided that
a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment with a minimum of
not less than 14 years. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971,
ch. 38, par. 9-1.) After January 1, 1973
the statute provided for a minimum of "14
\ears unless the court, having regard to
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the
defendant, sets a higher minimum term;"
plus a parole term of 5 years. (Ill.Rev.
Stat.1973, ch. 38, pars. 1005-8-1 (c)(1) and
(e)(1).) Defendant elected to be sentenced under the old statute.

and LEIGHTON, JJ., con-

( O | KEY KUMKI SYSTIM>

34 Ill.App.3d 448
Sol I. DVORKIN, Individually and on hit
own behalf and on behalf of all the class of
other persons similarly situated, PlaintiffAppellant,

I L L I N O I S B E L L TELEPHONE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, and America!
Telephone and Telegraph Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 59063.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division.
Nov. 20, 1975.

Action was brought by plaintiff on his*
own behalf and on behalf of class alleging
that telephone compan\'s policy and practice in providing sen :ces for personal use
of current, former and retired officers, directors and employees either without*
charge or at less than established rates viod

DVORKIN v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Cite as 340 N.E.2d 98

.ated Public Utilities Act. The Circuit
Court, Cook County, Charles R. Barrett, J.,
granted telephone company's motion to
strike complaint and dismiss suit for want
oi jurisdiction, and plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Court, Mejda, J., held that
complaint which was not for penalties but
:or refunds as damages or reparation for
.iicgedly illegal practices and which if successful would require that new rates be established stated cause of action within primary and exclusive jurisdiction of Commerce Commission.
Affirmed.

f. Public Service Commissions <§=»7.l

Jurisdiction of Commerce Commission
- :o proceedings against a public utility to
...over reparations for excessive charges
> primary and exclusive. S.H.A. ch. 1112/$,
ji§ 76-7$.
2. Corporations C=»382«/2

A common-law action will not originally lie at any time or under any circumstances for damages on account of exces-:ve rates allegedly charged by public utility. S.H.A. ch. III2/3, §§76-78.
3. Public Service Commissions <3=>I9(2)

111.

99

could be commenced originally in circuit
court but stated cause of action within primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commerce Commission. S.H.A. ch. 1 1 1 ^ ,
§§ 37-39, 76-78.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure <S»229

Party aggrieved by administrative action ordinarily cannot seek review in
courts without first pursuing all administrative remedies available to him; however, equitable relief is available if remedy
at law is inadequate.
6. Telecommunications <3=»337

Appellate Court would not assume that
Commerce Commission's decision, in respect to plaintiff's allegation that telephone
company's policy and practice of providing
services for personal use of current, former and retired officers, directors and employees either without charge or at less
than established rates violated Public Utilities Act, would be against plaintiff or that,
if unsuccessful, appeal would not eventually result in a different decision, or that in
any event public interest would suffer
through loss or probable loss of service,
and thus plaintiff was required to exhaust
his remedies before Commission. S.H.A.
ch. UI2/3, §§37-39,76-78.

Equity will not take jurisdiction of an
7. Equity <£=>!
:X:K>:: in which collateral attack is made
Commencement of class action does
< •• order oi Commerce Commission as to
allegedly excessive rates charged by public not automatically invoke jurisdiction of equity.
••itility. S.H.A. ch. III2/3, §§ 76-78.
4. Telecommunications €=337

8. Parties <§=>ll

Where complaint, in action brought by
plaintiff alleging that telephone company's
policy and practice of providing services
for personal use of current, former and retired officers, directors and employees either without charge or at less than established rates violated Public Utilities Act,
•••ii< not for penalties but was for refunds
'•> damages or reparation for alleged illegal practices, and would, if successful, re4uirc that new rates be established, complaint did not state cause of action which

Since telephone subscribers are served
by different exchanges with different
classes of service and rates for varying
periods of service, claim of each subscriber, with respect to telephone company's alleged violation of Public Utilities Act over
last 50 years, was legally separate and distinct and presented different question with
respect to right of recovery and amount of
alleged damages, and thus class action
sought to be asserted by plaintiff in action
alleging violation of Public Utilities Act

100
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did not have requisite common interest in
question involved.
9. Parties <§=>I0

Where plaintiff had no individual
cause of action, class action attempted to
be asserted by plaintiff also failed.
10. Telecommunications 0=337

Allegation that if Commerce Commission took action in respect to telephone
company's alleged violation of Public Utilities Act, such action would be limited to
one year even though alleged violations
had persisted for over 50 years without intervention by Commission, provided no basis for permitting plaintiff to maintain suit
based on alleged violations in circuit court
prior to exhaustion of remedies before
Commerce Commission. S.H.A. ch. 111?4,
§72.

Donald H. Sharp, L. Bow Pritchett, Edward Butts, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.
Max Earl Sherman, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

MEJDA, Justice.
Plaintiff, Sol I. Dvorkin, individually
and on behalf of a class, commenced an
original action in the circuit court of Cook
County for damages against defendants Illinois Bell Telephone Company and American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
The trial court granted the motion of Illinois Bell to strike the complaint and dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff appeals.
The sole issue for review is whether the
instant complaint states a cause of action
which may be commenced originally in the
circuit court. We affirm.
The complaint filed on April 28, 1972, by
plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf
of a class consisting of persons and corpo-

rations who have been subscribers, lessees,
patrons and customers of Illinois Bell from
the date the company first began the practice complained of was in two counts.
Count I alleged that Illinois Bell had a policy and practice of providing services for
the personal use of certain current, former
and retired officers, directors, and employees of Illinois Bell either without
charge or at less than the rate established
and in force as shown by the schedule filed
with the Illinois Commerce Commission, all
in contravention and violation of sections
37, 38 and 39 of the Illinois Public Utilities
Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 1 1 1 ^ , pars. 37,
38 and 39); that as a direct result of the
loss of revenue, plaintiff and the class are
required to pay greater rates for services
from Illinois Bell; and prayed that the
practice be declared unlawful and enjoined; and that judgment be entered
against Illinois Bell for the lost revenue
and punitive damages for the use and benefit of the class, and other relief. Count
II alleged that the illegal actions were with
the knowledge, control, management, connivance and complicity of American Telephone by reason of its ownership of 99 per
cent of the stock of Illinois Bell, and
prayed judgment against American Telephone for the losses and punitive damages
to be paid to Illinois Bell for the use and
benefit of plaintiff and the class, together
with other relief.
Section 37 of the Utilities Act prohibited
a public utility from charging greater or
less or different compensation than the
rates specified in its schedules on file and
in effect at the time "except such as are
regularly and uniformly extended to all
corporations and persons." An amendment
effective October 1, 1972 (P.A. 77-2759)
added a sentence: "No law of the State
shall be construed to prohibit a public utility from furnishing its service, product or
commodity to its employees, officers, directors or pensioners, or its employees, officers, directors or pensioners from receiving such service, product or commodity,
free or at rates or charges less than those

DVORKIN v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
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specified in its filed schedules."
Stat.1973, ch. 1 1 1 ^ , par. 37.)

(111.Rev.

Commerce Commission.
The pertinent
provisions of sections 72, 73 and 74 follow:

Section 38 of the Act prohibits the
granting of any preference or advantage
and the establishment or maintenance of
any unreasonable difference as to rates or
other charges, services, facilities, or in any
other respect, either as between localities
or as between classes of service." Section
39 further prohibits any utility, its officer,
agents and employees, from directly or indirectly permitting any corporation or person "to obtain any service, commodity, or
product at less than the rate or other
charge then established and in force as
shown by the schedules filed and in effect
at the time." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111%,
pars. 38 and 39.)

Sec. 72: "When complaint has been made
to the Commission concerning any rate
or other charge of any public utility
and the Commission has found, after a
hearing, that the public utility has
charged an excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount for its product, commodity or service, the Commission may
order that the public utility make due
reparation to the complainant therefor,
with interest at the legal rate from the
date of payment of such excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount.

The trial court, in the order granting Illinois Bell's motion to strike, found that
the alleged discrimination is "necessarily so
intertwined with establishment of rates or
tariffs as to constitute rates or tariffs isMie, rather than a question of discrimination per se," and that the exclusive jurisdiction for establishing rates and tariffs
and for the recovery of refunds or reparation for allegedly excessive charges is in
the Illinois Commerce Commission. Since
!
>«> ruling was made as to American Telephone, nor was the amendment to section
{
7 challenged in the trial court, neither
\M11 hv considered.
Plaintiff contends that in accordance
with section 73 of the Illinois Public Utility* Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 111%, par.
' ' ) . a civil action may be commenced in
*ny court of competent jurisdiction for the
violation by a public utility of sections 37,
*W and 39 of the Act. Further, that the
r
<*'»ie<ly is cumulative under the provisions
1,1
^-tn.ns 71 and 74 (pars. 76 and 78).
I)cf
^<lant Illinois Bell, on the other hand,
ton,
emls that the complaint states a claim
or
the recovery of refunds as reparation
the A K ° V e r n e d b y s e c t i o n 7 2 (P a r - 76 > o f
and that the exclusive
for
jurisdiction
r 8
uch recovery is vested in the Illinois

*

*

*

*

*

*

''The remedy provided in this section
shall be cumulative, and in addition to
any other remedy or remedies in this Act
provided in case of failure of a public
utility to obey a rule, regulation, order
or decision of the Commission, (par.
76)

Sec. 73: "In case any public utility shall
do, cause to be done or permit to be
done any act, matter or thing prohibited,
forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or
shall omit to do any act, matter or thing
required to be done either by any provisions of this Act or any rule, regulation,
order or decision of the Commission, issued under authority of this Act, such
public utility shall be liable to the persons or corporations affected thereby for
all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom, and if the
court shall find that the act or omission
was wilful, the court may in addition to
the actual damages, award damages for
the sake of example and by the way of
punishment. An action to recover for
such loss, damage or injury may be
brought in any court of competent jurisdiction by any person or corporation.

"No recovery as in this section provided shall in any manner affect a re-
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l o v e r y by the State of the penalties in
fliis Act provided, (par. 77)
S 8 . 74: ' T h i s Act shall not have the effect to release or waive any right of action by the State, the Commission, or by
any body politic, municipal corporation,
person or corporation for any right or
pnalty which may have arisen or acHjapi|ued or may hereafter arise or accrue
33§ider any law of this State.
["All penalties accruing under this Act
(all be cumulative of each other, and
lit for the recovery of one penalty shall
| t be a bar to or affect the recovery of
ay other penalty or be a bar to any
pminal prosecution against any public
glity, or any officer, director, agent or
jployee thereof, or any other corporaJn or person." (par. 78)
| his brief to this court, plaintiff states
h h e cause was filed to enforce the
discrimination provisions of the Illi| Public Utilities Act and to end the
ling of free and reduced rate services
iployees, management personnel, and
| d employees, and for the return of
pcSjtf charges levied against the public as
nit of the failure of Illinois Bell and
ijrent company to comply with the Act.
~ 'Section 72 of the Act provides for the
recogjery of reparations for excessive or
uflpfiftly discriminatory amounts charged
[itility when complaint has been made
Illinois Commerce Commission. By
\ms the remedy provided is curnuland in addition to any other remedy or
lies in the Act in case of failure of a
pubiS| utility to obey a rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission. Section 73 of the Act provides for the recovery of civil damages for loss, damages or
injury caused by or resulting from any act
or omission contrary to any provision of
the Act or of the Commission. Such action may be brought in am court of competent jurisdiction for consequential damages as distinguished from a claim for reparation. (See Malloy v. III. Bell Telephone Co. (1973), 12' Ill.App.3d 483, 299

N.E.2d 517.) Section 74 of the Act, consistently with the provisions of sections 72
and 73, provides that the Act shall not release or waive any right of action for any
right or penalty. The provision as to cumulative rights is confined to penalties and
suits for recovery of penalty. This latter
provision is inapplicable to actions for the
recovery of damages or reparations. The
action herein is not for penalties, but rather, for a refund as damages or reparations
for the allegedly illegal practice.
[1] The Illinois courts have uniformly
held that the jurisdiction of the Illinois
Commerce Commission as to proceedings
against a public utility to recover reparations for excessive charges is primary and
exclusive. See Terminal R.R. Assn. v.
Utilities Com. (1922), 304 111. 312, 317, 136
N.E. 797; C.NS. & M.R.R. Co. v. City of
Chicago (1928), 331 111. 360, 163 N.E. 141;
Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. III. Cent.
R. Co. (1936), 287 Ill.App. 549, 5 N.E.2d
782; Adler v. Northern Illinois Gas Co.
(1965), 57 Ill.App.2d 210, 206 X.E.2d 816;
Cummings v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
(1965), 64 Ill.App.2d 320, 213 N.E.2d 18;
and Malloy v. III. Bell Telephone Co.
(1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 483, 299 X.E.2d 517.
[2,3] A common-law action will not
originally lie "at any time or under any
circumstances" for damages on account of
excessive rates. (Medusa Portland Cement
Co., supra, 287 Ill.App. page 565, 5 N.E.2d
page 789.) Equity will not take jurisdiction of an action in which collateral attack
is made on the order of the Commission.
C.N.S. & M.R.R. Co., supra, 331 111. page
375, 163 N.E. 141.
In Cotton v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
(1953), 349 Ill.App. 490, 111 N.E.2d 363, in
affirming the dismissal of a class action
for injunctive relief which alleged that a
revision of rates deprived the class of constitutional rights, the court held that if the
legal remedy consists in part of proceedings before an administrative agency, equity should decline jurisdiction; that the
Public Utilities Act has superseded all
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common-law remedies so far as rates are
concerned; that the statutory remedies afforded consumers under the Act are exclusive ; that the rate filed with the Commission by a utility is presumed to be lawful;
that the complaint must be made in the
first instance before the Commission; and
that the courts do not have jurisdiction to
fix rates.
In Burke r. Illinois Bell Tel Co. (1952),
348 Ill.App. 529, 109 N.E.2d 358, the court
affirmed the dismissal of a class action
which sought a refund for defendant's failure to publish telephone directories semiannually. In holding that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court found that the gist of plaintiff's
claim was for reparations within the meaning of section 72 and not for consequential
or actual damages under section 73 as contended by the plaintiff.
In the recent case of Afalloy v. III. Bell
Telephone Co., supra, a class action complaint was filed against Illinois Bell in the
circuit court which sought a refund for a
six-day period during which electric service had been disrupted by vandalism.
There, as in the instant case, plaintiff relied
on section 74 in maintaining that the claim
was within section 73 and not section 72.
The court rejected the argument and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the claim was for reparations
under section 72 and not for consequential
damages, and that the Illinois Commerce
Commission therefore had exclusive jurisdiction.
Plaintiff here, as did the plaintiff in
Malloy, cites Barry v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1940), 374 111. 473, 29 N.E.2d
1014. In Barry, plaintiff initially filed a
Petition before the Illinois Commerce Commission for reparations which alleged that
,]
't utility wrongfully accused him of un•»vw'ully i y-passing the meter and taking
electricity, and wrongfully disconnected
y
m i c e and refused restoration until he
J*aid $800, the estimated amount of current
*lleKed to have been taken by fraud.
'femtiff prayed to be exonerated of the

unjust charges of fraud and the return of
the excess payment, which demand was reduced to $697 on hearing. The Commission refused to determine whether the current was obtained by fraud, and ordered
that the petition be dismissed and the parties left to their respective remedies at law.
Plaintiff Barry then ::led a complaint in
court, not as a review of the Commission's
order but as a new action. The first two
counts alleged the foregoing charges, and
additionally, that plaintiff was willing to
pay any amount due, and sought damages
for a wrongful disconnection of service
and for the loss of business thereby sustained.
The third count alleged that
agents of the utility charged plaintiff with
being a thief by stealing current, and
therein sought damages for slander. The
only issue presented was whether the prior
determination by the Commission was a
bar to the action at law. The Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's dismissal
and held that the action was not barred.
The Court stated that the finding by the
Commission as to reparations involved a
claim for the repayment of specific money
collected in excess of the legal rate, whereas the action at law involved a claim for
unliquidated damages to plaintiff, his business, and for slander resulting from the
utility's abuse of power. Barry supports
the dismissal in the instar.t case.
[4] Plaintiff argues that the instant action is brought to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act and that plaintiff and the
class have been and are required to pay
greater rates and charges than they would
if the practice of granting services without
charge or at reduced rates by Illinois Bell
had not been permitted. Plaintiff seeks
"the return of excess charges." Under
somewhat similar fact*, in Cummings : .
Commonwealth Edis.r. Cv. <1965», 64 ill.
App.2d 320, 324, 213 X.E.2d 18, 21, the
court stated:
"It is apparent that the sole basis for
plaintiffs claim, irrespective oi the label
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she chooses to employ, is that she and
other customers were charged excessive
rates for which she wants reparations.
The fact that plaintiff does not seek to
upset a rate schedule or fix utility rates
for the future does not bring this matter
within the powers of a court of equity
and outside the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Illinois Commerce Commission."
Although the complaint in the instant
case prays for such exemplary and punitive
damages as may be found proper, it addresses itself to the proposition that if Illinois Bell had not given discounted services
to some of its employees, plaintiffs rates
would have been lower, and that Illinois
Bell should be required to repay, account
for, refund or credit plaintiff and the class
the appropriate loss suffered as a result of
the allegedly unlawful practice. This is
necessarily predicated upon the allegedly
"excess charges" and therefore, upon the
excessive rates to plaintiff and the class,
and simultaneously, upon the inadequate
charges or rates to the employees and officers. Plaintiff, in order to obtain a return
of the portion of the charges paid by the
class as excess—clearly reparations as provided in section 72—seeks to reduce the
rates paid by him and the class by eliminating the practice of discounted services
to provide the additional revenues necessary to effect such reduction. If the practice is so eliminated and the present rate is
held excessive as alleged, a new rate must
then be established, based on the new revenues, and applicable to the class as well as
the employees and officers. This would
require the court to undertake the function
of the Commission by fixing what would
be considered a reasonable charge if the
concession services had not been granted.
This would further, involve rate-making by
the court. The statutory remedies and
procedures prescribed by the Illinois Public
Utilities Act are primary and exclusive;
the court does not have jurisdiction to fix
the rates. See Colton v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., supra.

Plaintiff further contends that without
court action the plaintiff class has no adequate remedy at law. He argues that the
practice of giving reduced rates and free
services dates back to General Order 18 issued by the Commission in 1914; that the
Commission, during a certain rate case, rejected the contention that Illinois Bell was
acting improperly in providing such free
and reduced rate service to employees;
and that in view of the Commission's willingness for more than 58 years to permit
such practice, contrary to the Act, further
resort to the Commission for relief is patently useless.
The rate case to which plaintiff refers
ultimately reached the Illinois Supreme
Court in ///. Bell Tel. Co. r. Commerce
Com. (1973), 55 I11.2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364.
On September 2\ 1971, Illinois Bell filed
with the Illinois Commerce Commission
new tariff schedules that provided for a
general increase in telephone rates applicable to all exchanges. The matter was
there pending when the instant suit was
filed on April 28, 1972. Numerous municipalities, persons, organizations and groups
filed appearances. On August 11, 1972,
the Commission entered an order granting
the rate increases. The order contained
findings which specifically included a recital that the Independent Voters of Illinois
[IVI] proposed several adjustments to
both Revenue and Expenses. The order
recited: 'They advocate the elimination of
free service and reduced rates for Company employees and pensioners; the elimination of virtually all advertising, public relations, and charitable contribution expenses
of all types and descriptions;" and that
"An examination of the Record does not
substantiate the sums for which the IVI
contended adjustments should be made."
The order specifically considered the items
of advertising, public relations, and charitable contributions, but did not further
mention the elimination of free service and
reduced rates. The order did, however,
provide that any objections and motions
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made in the proceedings that remained
were disposed of in a manner consistent
with the ultimate conclusions contained
therein. Following a petition for rehearing, an appeal was taken to the circuit
court and later to the Supreme Court as
provided by section 68 (Ill.Rev.Stat.l°71,
ch. 111?4 par. 72). The Commission order was affirmed by the circuit court. On
the appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
the contention that it was error to refuse
to disallow the concession service rates as
an operating expense was abandoned and
not considered. Plaintiff Dvorkin did not
seek to intervene or participate in such
proceeding at any time, as authorized by
statute (IlLRev.Stat.1971, ch. 111#, par.
69), but has instead brought the instant action in equity.
Plaintiff maintains that the Commission's willingness, for more than 5S years,
to permit the practice makes further resort
to the Commission for relief patently useless. In Adler v. Northern Illinois Gas
Co., supra, a class action was brought on
behalf of all customers of the utility for a
declaratory judgment and accounting,
alleging that the utility had fraudulently
enriched itself through the sale of natural
ws to its customers. The complaint, similar to the contention herein, alleged that
plaintiff had properly filed no complaint
with the Illinois Commerce Commission be«'au*e " '50 years of history of Illinois utility regulation apparently discloses no
precedent for lower rates obtained by individual consumers against large utilities,
^"ch remedy has become largely a fiction
«»r illusion.' " (57 Ill.App.2d 214, 206 X.E.
-M S17) The allegations there were insuff cient to avoid the primary jurisdiction of
the Commission. The court held that the
complaint, although alleging fraud, did not
present a cause of action for court proceedings until the prescribed statutory proc u r e s were exhausted.
1 li

"!'tiff argues that he should not be re'I'sirvu to engage in administrative proceed*nKs where the dispute is limited to a pure340 N.E 2 d — 7 V a
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ly legal issue and where the outcome is
predictable and the result foredoomed.
This argument was approved in People ex
rel. Naught on v. Dept. of Public Aid
(1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 43, 297 N.E.2d 7S4;
however, the decision was reversed in People ex rel. Naughton v. Swank (1974), 58
I11.2d 95, 317 N.E.2d 499. The Supreme
Court held that an applicant for relief who
is dissatisfied with the results of his internal administrative appeal may not ignore
the administrative review provided by statute to pursue a review of the determination by any form of action he chooses.
The court stated at pages 101-102, 317 N.
E.2d at page 503 that the legislative purpose "was designed to channel into a single
procedure the judicial review of the decisions made by administrative agencies in
particular cases." In the instant case,
plaintiff seeks relief by original proceedings in equity without first taking any action before the Commission for the requested remedy.
[5,6] The doctrine of exhaustion has
long been a basic principle of administrative law, and a party aggrieved by administrative action ordinarily cannot seek review in the courts without first pursuing
all administrative remedies available to
him; howe/er, exceptions recognize the
rule that equitable relief will be available
if the remedy at law is inadequate. (See
///. Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975),
60 I11.2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737.)
Here,
plaintiff would presume not only that the
Commission will decide against him, but
also that any appeal by administrative review to the trial and appellate courts will
not provide appropriate relief. The avoidance of a prior administrative decision
would severely undermine the legislative
purpose manifest in providing a statutory
review. We cannot assume that the Commission's decision will be against plaintiff
or that if unsuccessful, appeal will not
eventually result in a different decision, or
that in any event, the public interest will
suffer through loss or probable loss of
service. City of IVheaton v. Chicago, A.
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& E. Ry. Co. (1954), 3 Ill.App.2d 29, 37,
120 N.E.2d 370.
[7-9] Plaintiff also argues that the
Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain class actions and that the inherent
powers of a court of equity are needed to
provide redress. The commencement of
a class action does not automatically invoke
the jurisdiction of equity. The instant
proceeding was brought on "behalf of all
other persons
. . who have been
subscribers . . . from the date upon
which said company first began its unlawful practice/' Damages are claimed and
sought for those who were and are now
subscribers. This, plaintiff clearly cannot
do. As noted in Burke v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., supra, 348 Ill.App. at pages 536 and
537, 109 N.E.2d at page 362,
" . . .
subscribers are served by different exchanges with different classes of service
and rates for varying periods of service";
the claim of each subscriber is legally separate and distinct. Each claim presents a
different question with respect to the right
of recovery and the amount of alleged damages. The class action herein does not have
the requisite common interest in the questions involved. (See Hagerty v. General
Motors Corp. (1974), 59 I11.2d 52, 57-59,
319 N.E.2d 5.) Furthermore, since we have
held that plaintiff has no individual cause
of action, it necessarily follows that any attempted class action must also fail. Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n
(1973), 13 Ill.App.3d 578, 587, 301 N.E.2d
47; DePhillips v. Mortgage
Associates
(1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 759, 7<M, 291 N.E.2d
329.
[10] Plaintiff finally contends, without
citation of any authority, that if the Commission were to take action, the recovery
would be limited to a period of one year
under section 72 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch.
l l l ^ j , par. 76), and that it makes no sense
to restrict the plaintiff class to such limitation where the alleged violations have persisted over 50 years without intervention

by the Commission.
without merit.

The contention is

For the foregoing reasons the order of
the circuit court of Cook County dismissing plaintiff's complaint is affirmed.
Affirmed.
DEMPSEY and McNAMARA, JJ., concur.
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A title and trust company filed an
action to prohibit the negotiation of drafts
it issued as escrow agent to numerous
creditors of the person who funded the
escrow, and the action was consolidated
with an action for declaratory judgment
filed on behalf of some of the creditors,
in which they sought payment of the drafts
and damages sustained in reliance on them.
The Circuit Court, Cook County, Francis
T. Delaney, J., ordered rescission of the
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thereof, or any county, city and county, municipality, or other body politic
and the public utility affected may be interested, whether arising under the
provisions of articles 1 to 13 of this title, or otherwise, and such findings,
when so introduced, shall be conclusive evidence of the facts therein stated
as of the date therein stated under conditions then existing and such facts
can only be controverted by showing a subsequent change in conditions bearing upon the facts therein determined. The commission, from time to time,
may cause further hearings and investigations to be had for the purpose of
making revaluations or ascertaining the value of any betterments, improvements, additions, or extensions made by any public utility subsequent to any
prior hearing or investigation, and may examine into all matters which may
change, modify, or affect any finding of fact previously made, and at such
time may make findings of fact supplementary to those theretofore made.
Such hearings shall be had upon the same notice and be conducted in the
same manner, and the findings so made shall have the same force and effect
as is provided for such original notice, hearing, and findings. Such findings
made at such supplemental hearings or investigations shall be considered in
connection with and as a part of the original findings except insofar as such
supplemental findings shall change or modify the findings made at the original
hearing or investigation.
Source: L. 13, p. 501, § 55; C. L. § 2964: CSA, C. 137, § 55; CRS 53,
§ 115-6-18: C.R.S. 1963, § 115-6-18: L. 69, p. 952, § 50.
Am. Jur.2d. See 64 Am. Jur.2d, Public Utilities. § § 232. 268. 273, 279, 286.

C.J.S. See 73B C.J.S.. Public Utilities, § 80.

40-6-119. Excess charges - reparation - actions - limitation. (1) When complaint has been made to the commission concerning any rate, fare, toll, rental,
or charge for any product or commodity furnished or service performed by
any public utility and the commission has found, after investigation, that the
public utility has charged an excessive or discriminatory amount for such
product, commodity, or service, the commission may order that the public
utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from
the date of collection, provided no discrimination will result from such
reparation.
(2) If the public utility does not comply with the order for the payment
of reparation within the specified time in such order, suit may be instituted
in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the same. All complaints
concerning excessive or discriminatory charges shall be filed with the commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and the
petition for the enforcement of the order shall be filed in the court within
one year from the date of the order of the commission. The remedy provided
in this section shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy in
articles 1 to 7 of this title provided in case of failure of a public utility to
obc\ the order or decision of the commission.
Source: L. 13. p. 502, 8 56: C. L. 8 2965: CSA, C. 137, § 56: CRS 53,
8 115-6-19: C.R.S. 1963, § 115-6-19.

S3

Hearings and Investigations

Am. Jur.2d. See 64 Am. Jur.2d, Public Utilitics $ § 58. 59, 275.
C J . S . See "^B C.J.S.. Public Utilities,
* § 46-49.
A railway company exacting an unreasonable
charge for its service must make reparation to
Ihe extent of the excess. Bonfils v. Public Util.
( omm'n. 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920).

40-6-120

Tariff on file, if unreasonable, is no answer
to the shipper's demand for reparation. Bonfils
v. Public Util. Comm'n. 67 Colo. 563. 189 P.
775(1920).
Subsection (2) of this section is to be so construed as to have a prospective effect only.
Bonfils v. Public Util. Comm'n. 67 Colo. 56?.
189 P. 775 (1920).

40-6-120. Temporary authority. (1) To enable the provision of carrier
service for which there appears to be an immediate and urgent need to any
point or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such
need, the commission may, in its discretion and without hearings or other
proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier
or a contract carrier by motor vehicle, as the case may be. Such temporary
authority, unless suspended or revoked for good cause, shall be valid for
such time as the commission specifies, but for not more than an aggregate
of one hundred eighty days, unless for good cause shown the commission
extends such temporary authority for a period of time which may extend
until a final administrative decision is rendered, and shall create no presumption that corresponding permanent authority will be granted thereafter.
(2) Pending the determination of an application filed with the commission
for approval of acquisition of stock of a carrier, or of a consolidation or
merger of two or more carriers, or of a purchase, lease, or contract to operate
the properties of one or more carriers, the commission may, in its discretion
and without hearings or other proceedings, grant temporary approval for a
period not exceeding one hundred eighty days for the operation of the carrier
or carrier properties sought to be acquired by the person proposing in such
pending application to acquire such properties or stock, if it appears that failure to grant such temporary approval may result in destruction of or injur\
to such carrier or carrier properties sought to be acquired, or to interfere
substantially with their future usefulness in the performance of adequate and
continuous service to the public. Temporary approval shall create no presumption that the application will be granted thereafter.
(3) Transportation service rendered under such temporary authority or
approval is subject to all applicable provisions of articles 1 to 13 of this title
and to the rules, regulations, and requirements of the commission thereunder.
The maximum time period of any temporary authority or approval shall not
be extended or renewed under the provisions of article 4 of title 24. C.R.S..
or otherwise.
(4) No temporary authority or approval may be issued by the commission
unless, under such general rules as the commission may prescribe governing
the application therefor and notice thereof to interested or affected carriers,
any such interested or affected carrier has been given five days' notice of
the filing of the application and afforded an opportunity to protest the granting thereof. If the commission is of the opinion that an emergency exists.
it may issue temporary authority or approval at once by making specific reference in its order to the circumstances constituting the emergency, in which
case no notice need be given, but any such emergency authority or approval
shall expire no later than fifteen days after it was issued.
Source: L. 69. p. 953. § 51; C.R.S. 1963, § 115-6-20: L. 79. p. 1516. § 1:
L. 83. p. 1563. § I.

